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INTRODUCTION
What is ‘agricultural and resource policy’? This question can
be answered in two ways. Firstly, it may be seen as applying
economic ways of thinking to socio-economic issues in the agri-
cultural and resource sector where ‘the government’ is somehow
involved. Government may be involved in various ways: as the
solution to a problem, perhaps as the cause of a problem, or
even as an innocent by-stander. But, somehow, government is
involved by doing—or not doing—something. Policy analysis
requires a systematic, theoretical framework for analysing specific
problems. This book is concerned with developing just such a
framework.
But agricultural and resource policy is more than just theory—it
is the application of economics to real world problems. Thus,
secondly, policy analysis involves asking questions about existing
and/or possible government activities, and using a systematic,
theoretical framework to develop answers to those questions. The
key to good policy analysis is asking the right questions about existing
or proposed policies. The kinds of questions that should be asked
include:
• Why do governments make decisions?
• How do governments make decisions?
• What are the economic consequences of the decisions that govern-
ments make?
The objective of studying agricultural and resource policy is not
to learn a lot of facts about policy making. The objective is to
understand the principles that determine how policy is made, how
economists understand and evaluate the policy making process
and, by using examples, to gain practical experience in apply-
ing these principles. The approach to analysis of agricultural and
resource policy in this book does not involve, therefore, an exhaus-
tive survey of Australian policy. Rather, the objective is to develop
a framework which provides a starting point for analysing natural
resource policy issues, and agricultural policy issues in particular.
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Natural Resources and Agriculture
Agricultural policy analysis has often been confined to a rather
narrow view of ‘agriculture’. This limited view arises from identify-
ing ‘agriculture’ with ‘farming’. A more useful view of agriculture
is that it comprises farms and all their linkages with the rest of
the economy, especially the linkages between farm production
and natural resources. Agriculture is simply one use of a set of
natural resources comprising land, water and air. It competes with
other uses for the land base—urban and semi-urban (e.g. hobby-
farming), infrastructure (roads, railways), tourism and recreation,
mining, water catchment, forestry and wilderness. Agriculture
competes with other sectors for water, such as domestic, com-
mercial and industrial uses, and environmental flow. Agriculture
also affects other users of natural resources. Economists are espe-
cially interested in non-marketed spillovers (‘externalities’) which
may occur between agriculture and other industries, or among
agricultural firms. Such externalities include natural resource
degradation, such as dryland and irrigation salinity, soil and water
contamination (especially from animal wastes of the intensive live-
stock industries), blue-green algae (together with urban run-off),
pests and diseases (of both indigenous and exotic origin), and
natural disasters such as bushfires and floods.
The scope of agricultural and resource policy addressed in
this book is illustrated in Figure 1. Agriculture uses both natural
resources (land, water and air) and produced inputs (machin-
ery; agricultural chemicals, fertilisers and other farm supplies;
services such as machinery repair, accounting and legal, farm
technical advice from the private and public sectors, specialised
labour and contracting services such as shearing, pest control) to
produce farm output. Some output is consumed within the agri-
cultural sector, such as on-farm conserved feed; grain for seed, and
other planting material; and feedstuffs for the intensive livestock
industries such as pigs, poultry, dairy, beef feedlots, horses. Some
output is non-marketed in the form of externalities. Most farm
output is consumed outside the agricultural sector: depending
on the industry, most may be consumed domestically (e.g. fruit
and vegetables, ornamentals, pigmeat, oilseeds, sheepmeats), pre-
dominantly exported (wool, cotton, sugar, wheat, feedlot beef) or
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shared between the domestic and export markets (extensive beef,
rice, barley).
For products primarily consumed domestically, marketing chan-
nels have a major impact on the profitability of agricultural
production. Marketing channels include all processes from the
assembly of agricultural products at farm-gate, through trans-
portation and storage, to processing and wholesale and retail
distribution. Marketing channels are especially affected by govern-
ment intervention which affects the institutional structure of the
marketing chain; such intervention has been a traditional focus
of agricultural policy analysis. However, the efficiency of these
marketing channels, and their economic impacts on agriculture,
are also affected by economic conditions external to agriculture,
including general economic conditions and government policy.
For products primarily exported, marketing channels also have
a major impact on the profitability of agricultural production.
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These marketing channels also are partly affected by domestic
economic conditions. Macroeconomic conditions and national
macroeconomic policy, especially relating to exchange rates, have
a major impact on export-oriented agriculture.
Also important are the impacts of international economic condi-
tions, and agricultural policies, in countries which import Australia
agricultural products, or which produce competitive products.
These international aspects deserve a special treatment because of
the importance of trade theory to their analysis and are not covered
in this book. Until the relatively recent past, Australian agriculture
has had a major impact on general economic conditions and
general economic policy because of its major impact on inter-
national economic conditions through agriculture’s dominance
in Australia’s exports. The decline of Australian agriculture’s
macroeconomic importance, and the implications of this decline
for economic and agricultural sector policy, are important issues.
Encountering Agricultural and Resource Policy
The reader is likely to have at least three types of encounter with
policies for agricultural and resource policy.
An encounter of the first kind is an economics practitioner.
Economists are constantly involved in evaluating current economic
policies. Those relating to macro economic decision making—the
setting of interest and tax rates and the level of government spend-
ing, and the balance between monetary and fiscal policy—are
currently the most visible. But, of most interest in this book, are
microeconomic policies. In the agricultural sector, post-World War
Two policy was traditionally oriented to the construction of orderly
marketing schemes for agricultural products; and economists were
extensively involved in evaluating existing policies and proposals
for their extension. From the early 1970s, these marketing schemes
slowly began to fall into disfavour, although it took until the late
1980s with the deregulation of domestic wheat marketing and the
collapse of the wool reserve price scheme for substantial inroads
to be made into marketing regulation. But marketing schemes
were not the limit of government intervention in marketing—nor
was marketing the only focus of government intervention.
An encounter with agricultural and resource policy of the sec-
ond kind is as a participant in the policy process. Many of the
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readers of this book will be involved as participants in the gov-
ernmental process—as politicians; as public service analysts and
advisers; as lobbyists, or advisers or public relations ‘flaks’ for
lobbyists; as ‘hired-gun’ analysts (a major growth industry since
the deregulatory fervour of the 1980s); or as economic analysts in
the print or electronic media. In these roles, an economist may
not necessarily use—or be permitted to use—the full range of
economic skills that are available, or even use the selection of
economic tools that are presented in subsequent chapters. But,
hopefully, they will be aware of any anorexic version of economics
that they use.
An encounter with the policy process of the third—and ulti-
mately the most important—kind is as a citizen. If the price of
liberty is eternal vigilance, democracy has a similar price. Aus-
tralian citizens are required to attend polling booths (although
voting is not compulsory) every three or four years for both
Federal and State elections (and more frequently for Federal
elections if House of Representatives and Senate elections are
not synchronised). Ratepayers and residents may also vote in
local government elections. Referenda for a variety of purposes,
including amendments to the Commonwealth Constitution, are
held irregularly. If a better-informed citizenry results in a better-
performing government, a better understanding of the policy
process and a more vigorous scrutiny of its participants will advan-
tage society at large, and this book will have achieved an important
objective.
Historical Context
The contemporary setting of Australian agriculture is a func-
tion of its evolution. Australian agriculture now makes about the
same contribution to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) as the Aus-
tralian mining industry (Table 1). Agriculture contributes about
as much to the aggregate economy as do the electricity, gas and
water industries combined; or the entire transport industry; or
the entertainment, hotel and club industries combined (Table 1).
Agriculture makes about one-quarter of the contribution of manu-
facturing to GDP; about one-third the contribution of services from
dwellings; and about one-half the contribution to GDP of either
wholesale or retail trade (Table 1). Agriculture’s contribution to
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Table 1 Agriculture Compared to the Australian Economy
1986–87 1993–94
GDP % of total GDP % of total
($m) GDP ($m) GDP
Agriculture 13211 4.1 15121 3.8
Forestry, fishing, hunting 1182 0.4 1299 0.3
Mining (excluding services) 12114 3.8 16703 4.2
Services to mining 504 0.2 513 0.1
Manufacturing 52302 16.4 62535 15.9
Electricity 6689 2.1 8600 2.2
Gas 818 0.3 1029 0.3
Water 2817 0.9 3195 0.8
Construction 25151 7.9 26862 6.8
Wholesale trade 24770 7.7 29168 7.4
Retail trade 30540 9.6 37886 9.6
Rail transport 1545 0.5 1880 0.5
Water transport 1568 0.5 1896 0.5
Air transport 2833 0.9 4719 1.2
Road and other transport, and storage 9341 2.9 11681 3.0
Communications 6261 2.0 11525 2.9
Finance, property and business services 38516 12.0 44491 11.3
Public administration and defence 11949 3.7 14681 3.7
Community services 36095 11.3 47431 12.0
Entertainment and recreational
services
4811 1.5 6159 1.6
Restaurants, hotels, clubs and personal
services
9487 3.0 11253 2.9
Ownership of dwellings 31430 9.8 39041 9.9
Import duties 2783 0.9 4376 1.1
less imputed bank service charges -7081 -7858
Total 319636 394186
Source: Australian Bureau of Statistics (1994, Table 63)
the Australian economy has, however, changed markedly over the
past five decades, and the current institutional framework and
policies for agriculture and resources reflect this change.
An occasional reaction to the material covered in this book is that
there is too much ‘old’ material in it. Depending on the reader’s
age, this might mean that some of the readings, or policies dis-
cussed, have dates before 1985—or even 1990. There are several
explanations for the ‘antiquity’ of some of the material included.
Firstly, while agents in the policy process are often remarkably
inventive, their inventiveness frequently takes the form of recy-
cling old tricks. Policy analysts who do not have a good knowledge
of past analysis are condemned to repeat it. Secondly, some ‘old’
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analysis is remarkably robust and is applicable to contemporary
conditions as long as appropriate adjustments are undertaken for
the empirical context. Thirdly, what might currently be observed
as inappropriate policy might have its origins in policies that were
appropriate when they were initially implemented. Policy analysis
which neglects evolution in the underlying economic conditions
that helps determine the appropriateness of policy, or evolution in
the policy-generating process itself, is doomed to be constantly sur-
prised by the apparent need to continually adjust policy. However,
if policy is implemented and evaluated in the certain knowledge
that it will operate in a world of constant change, there is a better
chance of performing relevant policy analyses—and perhaps even
ultimately implementing policies that will be relatively robust to the
‘real world’.
Agricultural policy since the Second World War can be seen
as a process of transition in agricultural policy from sector- and
industry-specific policies to more general policies for the economy
as a whole. At the beginning of the 1950s, Australian agriculture
played a significant role as the major export earner: 86 per cent
of total export produce emanated from the agricultural sector
in 1953–54 and agriculture employed 15.8 per cent of the work-
force in 1947 (Vernon 1965, pp. 515, 1006). With relatively fixed
exchange rates, a dominant export sector was crucial for generat-
ing the export income to pay for imports (Edwards and Watson
1978, p.190). Agriculture was central to the development of Aus-
tralia inasmuch as that development was dependent on imports.
Nurturing agriculture, and especially agricultural exports, was
necessary for promoting economic development in the face of a
balance-of-payments constraint to economic growth. Despite the
substantial re-orientation of Australia’s international relations dur-
ing the War towards the USA, Australia was still viewed by its own
Government (and the UK Government) as an appendage of the
UK’s economy. The serious economic difficulties Britain faced as a
result of its war financing, and Australia’s membership of the ‘ster-
ling bloc’, meant that Australia’s economic policy was also partly
seen as an appendage of UK policy (Box 1). Because of interna-
tional policy intervention in the form of fixed exchange rates, there
existed a (second-best) ‘efficiency rationale’ for interventions by
Australian governments to promote agricultural production and
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Box 1 Agricultural Production Aims
Our task now is to expand agricultural production so as to
meet the domestic needs of our growing population and
to increase our overseas purchasing power.
The balance of payments problem which confronts Aus-
tralia underlines the urgent need to step up the rate of
expansion and development in our primary industries.
These industries have always been the major source of our
export income and it is to them that we look for an increase
in our overseas earnings.
Grains and sugar are two of the largest items of the United
Kingdom dollar expenditure and any increase in the
exports of these commodities from Australia to the United
Kingdom or to any other country in the sterling area rep-
resents a saving of dollars, and thus contributes to the
balancing of receipts and expenditures in the dollar area.
The Australian Agricultural Council, in April, 1952, an-
nounced a set of production aims for certain agricultural
products, the target date being five years hence . . .
Acceptance of these aims by the Australian Agricultural
Council means that both the Commonwealth and State
Governments have recognised these defined levels of pro-
duction as bench marks on which to base their policies.
Source: McEwen (1952, pp. 3–5)
exports. Examples of such interventions included home price
schemes (in wheat, dairy, sugar and dried fruits), tax concessions,
export promotion, publicly-funded research and development,
land development, and the provision of rural infrastructure.
One seminal event, and two important processes, in the 1960s
initiated events that eventually shattered the pivotal role of agricul-
ture in the Australian economy. The seminal event was the initial
abortive attempt by the UK Government to join the European Eco-
nomic Community (EEC) in 1961–62. It was clear, even at the time,
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that Britain remained determined to join the EEC and that, once
this occurred, Australia was unlikely to retain its extensive access to
UK markets for agricultural products (cf. James 1971). Australian
farm export industries therefore rapidly developed alternative
markets, initially especially in Japan and later throughout East Asia.
The first important process to affect Australian agriculture in the
1960s did so in a negative sense—at least during the 1960s. Amer-
ican agricultural economists had, from the 1950s, emphasised the
relative contraction of the agricultural sector as economic growth
proceeded. This analysis was generally conducted, however, in
the context of a non-exporting agricultural economy. By con-
trast, the Australian agricultural sector had a substantial export
component. The steady growth in the world economy through
the 1950s and 1960s meant that—even in the face of significant
trade barriers—there were sufficient outlets for Australian agri-
cultural exports that stagnant or contracting domestic demand
had substantially less impact than in other developed economies.
The second important process was the post World War II Aus-
tralian mining boom beginning with the discovery of massive iron
ore deposits in Western Australia, and subsequently extending to
major discoveries and/or development of other mineral deposits.
The relaxation of export controls on iron ore foreshadowed the
subsequent enormous development of the Australian minerals
industry. This minerals boom provided the conditions for the rela-
tive decline of the Australian agricultural sector, analogously to the
constraint provided by domestic orientation for US agriculture.
By the early 1970s, political forces conspired to create an Aus-
tralian Labor Government which was markedly less sympathetic
to the agricultural sector than its Coalition predecessors (e.g. its
termination of the superphosphate, dairy and cotton bounties).
By commissioning the ‘Green Paper’ on agriculture, the Labor
Government provided a platform for public discussion of the
effect on agriculture of the structural changes that were then
proceeding in the Australian economy, and for reassessing the
need for special policies for agriculture. By creating the Industries
Assistance Commission (IAC), the Labor Government provided
a relatively permanent forum for public discussion of economic
ideas that both directly affected agricultural policy (cf. Edwards
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Box 2 Green Paper and IAC Objectives
a. improve the efficiency with which the community’s pro-
ductive resources are used;
b. encourage those economic activities in Australia, and
the producers of the goods and services concerned,
which contribute to improving the efficiency with which
the community’s productive resources are used;
c. facilitate adjustment to changes in the economic envi-
ronment by industries and persons affected by those
changes;
d. recognise the interests of consumers and consuming
industries likely to be affected by the Commission;
e. ensure that any measures for assistance to, and devel-
opment of, industries are integrated with national eco-
nomic policy as a whole;
f. ensure that Australia’s trade and protection policies are
compatible.
Source: Harris et al (1974, Chapter 3, quoting the IAC Act)
(1980) for early IAC examinations of agricultural policy), and indi-
rectly affected agriculture through examining industry protection
in other sectors (Box 2).
International economic disruption associated with US involve-
ment in the Vietnam war and the first oil price shock of 1973
coincided with the Australian Labor Government of the early
1970s. This disruption was followed by subsequent instability and
diminished economic growth in developed economies (including
Australia, and despite its growing trade with Japan and emerging
economies of East Asia). The effects of this dislocation resulted
in increasing economic criticism of the extent of government
intervention in the Australian economy. While progress towards
deregulation was not consistent—for example, protection in the
motor vehicle industry increased in the second half of the 1970s
(Balderstone 1982, Table 4.4)—the intellectual debate favouring
the demise of industry protection and ‘protection all round’ was
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won by the end of the 1970s. The political debate had intensified
with the creation of the National Farmers’ Federation in 1979, and
its adoption of ‘economic rationalist’ policies (National Farmers’
Federation 1981). Such policies were adopted, albeit in a very
muted form, in the Balderstone Report on agriculture in 1982
(Box 3). Consistent with this theme, the Federal Coalition Gov-
ernment commissioned an enquiry into the financial sector which
subsequently provided the arguments supporting deregulation of
the financial sector in the 1980s.
Although there were other contemporaneous pressures for
deregulation—e.g. IAC recommendations for deregulating the
Australian wheat industry and pressures for tariff reduction—
deregulation of the financial sector beginning in late 1983 was the
catalyst for a sequence of as-yet-unended deregulations affecting
large parts of the Australian economy. Once the financial sector
was deregulated, some forms of government intervention became
increasingly difficult to manage (e.g. the Wool Reserve Price
Scheme). Other forms of regulation also became increasingly
Box 3 The End of the 1970s: the Balderstone Report
General aims and objectives of agricultural policy:
• be responsive to national and international economic
developments;
• create conditions under which the agricultural sector
can handle change and at the same time realise its full
potential in contributing to national economic growth;
• aim to encourage the efficient use and conservation of
the nation’s resources;
• promote the adoption of new technology and increased
productivity in the farm sector; and
• be consistent with other national policies and goals. There
also should be consistency of policy at the Common-
wealth, State and local levels of government.
Source: Balderstone et al. (1982, para. 1.14)
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difficult to justify (cf. Box 4); in agriculture, there was deregulation
of the domestic marketing of wheat, and substantial deregula-
tion of the storage, handling and transport of grain. But, as
deregulation of the financial sector proceeded, the deregulatory
fervour it invoked increasingly acquired the air of a religious
crusade.
The effects of financial sector deregulation were superimposed
on two other processes of the 1980s. The first was an international
economic boom. The second, specific to agriculture, was the
rapid increase in US agricultural protectionism from the mid-
1980s, ostensibly as a bargaining chip to induce West Europeans
to reduce agricultural protection. This increased protectionism
resulted in greater levels of world agricultural trade, and greater
competition for markets, culminating in depressed prices for many
agricultural products. Depressed commodity prices, exacerbated
by the collapse of farm-gate wool prices with the demise of the
Reserve Price Scheme in 1990 and the effects of high interest rates
resulting from international economic conditions and domestic
macroeconomic policy, financially weakened many agricultural
producers just as much of Queensland and northern NSW entered
a long drought in 1991.
It is easy to look back on the past, and characterise it as a
process of economic and policy transition. Without a crystal ball,
however, it is difficult to see beyond the immediate present. In the
large, there was the ostensible determination of the Federal Labor
Government of 1983–96, and the subsequent Coalition govern-
ment, to deregulate the Australian economy, even to the extent
of pushing the States to deregulate significant portions of their
own domains. Until 1993, the Federal Opposition Coalition had
promoted even more extensive structural change in the Australian
economy. Most State governments also paid at least lip service to
the need for further deregulation of or structural reform in the
economy. The evolution of the former Industries Assistance Com-
mission into the Industry Commission via absorbing the functions
of the Inter-State Commission, gave the national Government a
public process for investigating areas of the economy formerly
beyond the purview of the IAC. Additionally, the Federal Govern-
ment commissioned the Hilmer Report to accelerate the progress
towards increasing competitiveness.
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Box 4 Policies for the Deregulatory 1980s
Underpinning the economic policy reforms are the Gov-
ernment’s social goals of greater and more equal oppor-
tunity, substantial improvements in living standards, an
enhanced quality of life for all Australians and care for our
environment. While objectives for the primary industries
and energy sector are expressed in terms of efficient eco-
nomic and resource management principles, it is progress
towards these social goals that is the ultimate outcome of
improved economic performance.
The Government’s long-term objectives were:
• enhancing productive capacity through
— balanced management and development of natural
resources
— developing human skills
— improving technical capacity and research
• developing a more responsive and productive industry
structure, featuring
— an economy-wide approach to policy reform
— lower protection all round and better-balanced assis-
tance
• influencing and responding to the external environment
— better (international) marketing of Australian pro-
duce
— reducing international trade distortions
• more efficient government business enterprises, and trans-
port & services
• positive assistance for structural adjustment
Source: Kerin and Cook (1988, pp.4–8)
But it is not the role of this book to divine the future. Both
public and private sectors have hordes of highly paid soothsayers
and entrails fossickers employed to do just that. And at least some
readers of this book will hopefully join that well-remunerated
band. The objective of this book is to provide a framework which
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economic analysts might use to undertake their own analysis
of policy issues. Those who wish for regular updates on policy
specifics might undertake the annual trek to the National Agri-
cultural and Resources Outlook Conferences, wade through the
financial, daily and agricultural press, dip lightly into television,
and put their name on the mailing lists of a few well-chosen
politicians.1 This book will have achieved its purpose if it helps
these future analysts to better organise their approach to policy
analysis.
Outline
The art of policy analysis is to combine economic efficiency
analysis (Chapter 1) with public choice (Chapter 2) in the
context of the relevant institutional framework (Chapter 3).
But economic analysis of policy is not the mere mechanical
application of theory and techniques. Insight is required to
identify relevant problems, to identify the key aspects of these
problems, and to appropriately combine economic efficiency,
distributional and public choice aspects. Policy analysis itself is
partly an economic problem—which combination of economic
efficiency, distributional and public choice aspects is optimal to
select, given the financial and informational constraints facing the
analyst?
A simple framework for integrating efficiency, distributional
and public choice aspects of microeconomic policy is utilised in
Chapters 4–11 and outlined below.
Policy Issue
Investigating the ‘Policy issue’ means describing the perceived—or,
perhaps, unperceived or misconceived—‘problem’. Why does the
present state of the world require—or appear to require—rectifi-
cation via government action? The appropriate identification of
the policy issue is crucial to good policy analysis. If economists
want their analysis to be effective, they must evaluate policy prob-
lems that are real as perceived by the policy makers. However,
policy makers are not necessarily perfect in identifying real policy
issues—they may persist in supporting outmoded policies long
after their use-by date; they may be ‘captured’ by interest groups
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or simply wish to support the interest groups who support them,
irrespective of the effects of resulting policy on social welfare; or
they may be ill-advised by their public servants. Policy analysts
who do not dance to the policy-maker’s tune have, therefore, a
vital role. Such independent analysts are unlikely, however, to be
employed to work for policy participants—whether politicians,
political parties, lobby groups or in the public service.
Policy Intention
Analysing the ‘Policy intention’ means describing the objective
of policy—that is, what policy makers intend to achieve. The
intention of policy may be to eliminate or reduce economic
inefficiency, to increase incomes of disadvantaged sections of the
community, to redistribute income towards members of powerful
lobby groups, or to provide sops to less powerful lobby groups.
It is tempting to assume that, just because a policy issue has
been identified, the intention of any corresponding policy will
be consistent with the identified issue. While this may happen, it
will not necessarily do so. Participants in the policy process may
simply misunderstand the nature of the policy issue and make an
inappropriate decision. Or, even if policy makers appropriately
match a policy intention with the policy issue they have identified,
their intention may be derailed as a consequence of incompetence
in implementation, competition within the bureaucracy which
produces an unintended result, or competition among lobby
groups which may derail the original intention. Or government, or
one of the other policy participants, may propound one intention
while covertly intending to implement another.
Area of Sector
The ‘area’ of the resources sector that is relevant to policy analysis
denotes both where the ‘policy issue’ is perceived to exist, and
where the resultant policy is to be implemented. Policy may
target the natural resource base, the farm sector, post-farm-gate
industries, other sectors of the economy or the economy as a whole.
The analyst must be able to identify where policy is intended to
have an effect, so that this effect can be estimated or predicted,
and evaluated. The analyst must also be aware that, even if a policy
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carefully targets the intended area of the sector, there will be
‘collateral damage’—it is rare that the effects of a policy can be
quarantined to the area of intended effect.
Policy Orientation
‘Policy orientation’ refers to the level of government where policy
intervention occurs. Both the Federal and State governments
may intervene in external or domestic policy issues as permitted
under the Commonwealth Constitution. The States also legislate
to provide the powers of local government. A combined approach
to policy involving two, or even all three, levels of government may
be necessary or desirable.
Policy Mechanism
A ‘policy mechanism’ is the vehicle by which policy is imple-
mented: Acts or Regulations of Parliament, or executive decision.
Government may choose to intervene directly by direct control,
ownership of commercial or potentially commercial activities, or
ownership of non-commercial undertakings. Government may also
intervene indirectly, by seeking to influence individuals’ activities
or community attitudes. The policy analyst must be sensitive to the
wide variety of mechanisms by which governments can intervene,
and diligent in discerning their often subtle or hidden forms. The
participating policy analyst needs creativity with regard to mech-
anisms to be able to present policy makers with feasible, perhaps
durable, hopefully unchallengeable and occasionally novel policy
instruments.
Institutional Structure
The ‘institutional structure’ of intervention concerns the various
organs of government that develop, evaluate, enact and imple-
ment policy, and the various interest groups that interact with
government to both effect and affect policy. Not only is the
structure of these institutions important, but also the form and
relative power of the relationships within and between organisa-
tions, and the determinants of these structures and relationships,
and their forms and power. Without a good understanding of the
processes by which policy is formulated, policy analysts cannot
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explain why particular policies are enacted (or not enacted), why
policies are implemented the way they are, or whether or not pos-
sible alternatives are likely to be adopted. Similarly, without such
understanding, policy advisers cannot develop policies which are
likely to be both acceptable to the interest groups for whom they
work, nor would their recommended policies have a high chance
of gaining approval from other players in the policy process.
Policy Performance Evaluation
‘Policy performance evaluation’ concerns why government policy
is evaluated, who evaluates policy, when policy is evaluated, how pol-
icy is evaluated, and whether or not there is any economic input into
policy evaluation. The nature of policy performance evaluation is
crucial for policy advisers, who may need to chart a course for
evaluation which is feasible in financial terms, bearable in political
terms, and satisfies the interests of lobby groups who may wish for,
or wish to escape, the review of policies which affect them. Policy
performance evaluation is also important for the independent
analyst who wishes to influence the policy process; unless the ana-
lyst’s intervention is carefully targeted, it is unlikely to be effective
against the noise of a plethora of competing interests—or, per-
haps, even counter-productive. Policy may be evaluated regularly
or occasionally, and frequently or rarely; evaluation may occur
publicly or privately, and be either formal or informal.
Economic Issues
‘Economic issues’ refers to the broad economic scope of a policy
problem. This scope will include the economic effects of existing
policies and alternative policy instruments. Important issues may
include efficiency versus distribution, partial equilibrium versus
macroeconomic or general equilibrium approaches, theoretical
versus empirical analysis, and the desirability of qualitative versus
quantitative analysis.
Analytic Techniques
‘Analytic techniques’ for policy analysis include any reputable
economic or econometric modelling. In partial equilibrium anal-
ysis, this may include graphical or algebraic analysis of simple
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partial equilibrium (including analysis of consumer and producer
surplus). Alternatively, partial equilibrium relationships may be
estimated econometrically as single equations or equation systems,
and consumer and producer surplus estimated quantitatively.
Partial equilibrium relationships may also be estimated using pro-
gramming techniques or, if supply and demand curves can be
estimated econometrically, they may be combined in mathemati-
cal programming models. Ultimately, general equilibrium models
may be constructed from estimated supply and demand equations.
Where variability (e.g. of weather or prices) is important, models
may incorporate stochastic analysis of important relationships. It
is salutary, however, to remember Edwards and Watson’s (1978,
p.192) sage advice that:
. . . economic policy making often hinges on simple figuring of the
key economic magnitudes involved.
The interaction of the agricultural and resources sector with the
rest of the economy, and the importance for agriculture of policies
external to agriculture, are evaluated in Part IV—‘intersectoral’
issues. As background, simplified models are constructed of the
effects on agriculture of changes in exchange rates and interest
rates, inflation, and wages policy. It is then shown why, for complete
analysis, more comprehensive models such as computable general
equilibrium (CGE) models are required to evaluate policy options.
Differential sectoral rates of export growth (the ‘Gregory’ thesis)
are examined as an example of the effect on agriculture of changes
intherestof theeconomy.BothsimplifiedandCGEmodelsareused
to examine the effects of differential sectoral rates of protection and
tariff compensation. Finally, the effects on agriculture of microeco-
nomic reform outside the agricultural sector—e.g. in banking and
indirect taxation, and the Hilmer reforms—are evaluated.
Conclusion
In Isaac Asimov’s ‘Foundation’ trilogy, the psychohistorian Hari
Seldon predicted the fall of the Galactic Empire based on Trantor,
and the future rise of the planet Terminus. These predictions
were based on a general stochastic psychological theory of human
emotions and reactions sufficiently good to predict the histori-
cal sweep of the future (Asimov 1953). Economists do not, as
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yet, have economic policy models that enable the prediction of
future events with such precision—and they probably never will.
Moreover, an inference from the ‘Lucas’ critique of 1970s macro-
econometric modelling is that such policy modelling is actually
impossible (Lucas 1976). The current status of economic analysis
of government policy—and for agricultural and resources policy
in particular—is a judicious blend of science and art.
Economic analysis of government policy has two key require-
ments. Firstly, good policy analysis demands an ability to ask the
right questions to identify the central issues of the problem. Good
analysis partly requires a good knowledge of economic theory
which can illuminate the problem; but such analysis needs to be
creative, to be able to see beyond a conventional formulation
of the problem. Good policy analysis also requires an adequate
empirical understanding of both the economic and institutional
conditions of the relevant industry or industries. A good under-
standing is required of how the present has evolved from the past,
and how the present is evolving into the future. Secondly, good
policy analysis requires the deployment of the right tools to obtain
appropriate answers to the questions that have been asked. But
the ways of answering the relevant questions need not necessarily
be complex: Edwards and Watson (1978, p.192) argued that ‘eco-
nomic policy making often hinges on simple figuring of the key
economic magnitudes involved’. The objective of this book is to
assist readers to develop their creative and analytical faculties and
therefore their skills in policy analysis.
If students merely rote learn ‘facts’ from this book, the author
has failed in his intention. The author has presented a method of
doing agricultural and resource policy, not the definitive approach.
Readers should critically appraise the arguments presented in this
book. Is the approach to doing agricultural and resource policy
appropriate? Have the arguments been adequately justified on
theoretical and empirical grounds? Has economic theory or the
empirical facts changed so that the conclusions reported are no
longer valid or relevant? Even where it is adopted as appropriate,
the book’s argument must be continually reassessed—and refined
and developed—for future evaluation of policy issues.
